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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
                     
 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
 These are appeals from the judgments of sentence 
imposed on Sidney Dickler and Richard Petrucci after each entered 
a plea of guilty to impeding the functions of the Resolution 
Trust Corporation ("RTC") in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1032(2). 
The defendants attack their sentences on two grounds: that the 
court prohibited them from submitting evidence at their 
sentencing hearings relevant to the calculation of the "loss" 
caused by their criminal conduct for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1 
and that the district court erred in calculating that loss.  We 
will reverse the judgments and remand for resentencing. 
 
I. 
 Sidney Dickler and Richard Petrucci were charged in a 
three-count indictment with offenses relating to their operation 
3 
of two companies: Action Repossession Services, Inc. ("Action 
Repossession") and Action Motors, Inc. ("Action Motors").  Action 
Repossession was in the business of repossessing cars on behalf 
of financial institutions.  Action Motors was a used car dealer. 
Dickler and Petrucci were principals in both companies.  Counts 
One and Two of the indictment charged Dickler and Petrucci with 
participating in a scheme to defraud two federally insured 
financial institutions, Horizon Financial Savings ("Horizon") and 
Atlantic Financial ("Atlantic"), in violation of 18 U.S.C.  
§ 1344.  According to the indictment, the criminal activity began 
in 1985.  The RTC became the conservator of Horizon on June 8, 
1989, and of Atlantic on January 11, 1990.  Count Three charged 
defendants with participating in a scheme to impede the functions 
of the RTC in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1032(2). 
 Action Repossession was under contract with the victim 
banks to repossess cars when a car owner defaulted on his or her 
car loan, or when a lease terminated and the car was not 
voluntarily returned.  Under its agreement with the banks, Action 
Repossession was to repossess and store the vehicle, prepare a 
condition report on the repossessed vehicle, and solicit three 
bona fide bids for the vehicle from prospective buyers.0  The 
                                                           
0
 As was apparently the custom in this business, Action 
Repossession operated pursuant to informal, oral contracts and 
the parties dispute the exact terms of the agreements.  For 
example, counsel for Action Repossession indicated at oral 
argument before this court that the company did not solicit bids 
for the banks pursuant to the repossession contract, but simply 
provided this as an enhancement to the contract.  This 
distinction is immaterial for purposes of this appeal, however, 
since it is clear that in soliciting bids for the banks and the 
RTC, pursuant to the terms of the agreement or otherwise, the 
4 
condition report and bids were then to be sent to the banks, who 
would either accept one of the bids or reject them all.  If the 
bids were rejected, the banks might sell the car at auction.  If 
one of the bids was accepted, the bank would send the vehicle 
title and bill of sale to Action Repossession, who was then 
expected to transfer title to the vehicle to the successful 
bidder on the bank's behalf. 
 The defendants' fraudulent scheme involved submitting 
false bids to the banks.  Instead of soliciting bona fide bids 
from used car dealers or individuals, Dickler and Petrucci 
submitted bids with the names of fictitious bidders with the 
intent that Action Motors would purchase the car for resale 
whenever a false bid was accepted.  Thus, under the scheme, when 
the bank accepted one of the bids and sent the title and bill of 
sale to Action Repossession, Action Motors would acquire the 
vehicle instead of the fictitious bidder and, after repairing and 
"detailing" it,0 would then resell the vehicle for a profit. 
 Prior to trial, Dickler and Petrucci each entered a 
plea of guilty to Count Three of the indictment pursuant to a 
plea agreement.  The respective plea agreements, which were the 
same in all aspects relevant to this appeal, provided that: (1) 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
banks and the RTC expected Action Repossession to solicit bona 
fide bids. 
0
 Petrucci defined detailing a car as thoroughly cleaning 
the interior and exterior (buffing, waxing, degreasing the 
engine, painting the engine compartment, cleaning the trunk, 
shampooing the interior, trunk, and carpeting), performing 
cosmetic repairs such as repairing holes in the upholstery, and 
in some cases adding or removing exterior details such as pin 
striping and window tinting. 
5 
that conduct charged in Counts One and Two could be considered 
"relevant conduct" for purposes of the presentence investigative 
report ("PSR"), (2) the relevant loss for purposes of applying 
U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1 was more than $120,000 and less than $500,000, 
(3) each defendant would assist the government in the 
investigation of other bank fraud violations, (4) a special 
assessment of $50 would be paid, (5) the defendants' offense 
levels under the Sentencing Guidelines should be reduced for 
acceptance of responsibility, (6) the offense levels should be 
increased two levels for aggravating roles, and (7) at 
sentencing, the government would move to dismiss the remaining 
counts and recommend that the defendants be given sentences in 
the middle range of the applicable guideline range. 
 In compliance with Federal Rule Criminal Procedure 
11(f), the court, before accepting the pleas of Dickler and 
Petrucci, asked the government to summarize its evidence as to 
Count Three.0  The government summarized the defendants' false 
bid scheme.  It submitted documentation to explain how the scheme 
worked, including a bid sheet, a condition report, a bill of 
sale, odometer disclosure statement, and an internal record of 
Action Possession indicating the purchase, repair, and retail 
sale of the vehicle.  In the course of explaining the 
illustrative documentation to the court, the government indicated 
that the scheme included not only the preparation and submission 
                                                           
0
 Rule 11(f) requires that a court inquire into the facts 
of the case to satisfy itself that there is a factual basis for 
the plea before accepting even a freely given plea. 
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of bids from fictitious bidders but also the preparation and 
submission of false condition reports.  Specifically, the 
government represented that it had spoken with the former lessee 
of the vehicle described in the sample condition report, who had 
explained that the vehicle had been in better condition when it 
was repossessed than represented on the condition report (e.g., 
he refuted that the tires were poor, that the car had no hubcaps, 
and that the tail light was broken), and that the signature 
purporting to be his on the condition report was not.  Each 
defendant, upon questioning by the court, agreed with the 
government's factual summary and entered his plea. 
 A PSR was subsequently prepared for each defendant.  In 
relevant part, the PSRs contained the following factual 
allegations and legal conclusions: the defendants would order 
employees to falsify the condition reports being sent to the 
financial institutions, the defendants' fraud caused the banks to 
lose monies on the vehicles because the submitted bids were "low 
balled," the defendants had obtained approximately $386,223 from 
the banks and the RTC through the submission of false bids 
(calculated by deducting the bid price and cost for detailing and 
repairing the vehicles from the price at which Action Motors sold 
the repossessed vehicles), and the amount they obtained 
represented the amount of loss for purposes of calculating the 
offense level under U.S.S.G.  
§ 2F1.1(b).   
 Sentencing hearings were held on September 2, 1994.  A 
separate hearing was held for each defendant although the court 
7 
held that any relevant information in the first hearing 
(Dickler's) could be incorporated into the second.  The focus of 
the hearings was the calculation of loss under U.S.S.G.  
§ 2F1.1(b).  Although they had stipulated to a loss of at least 
$120,000 in their respective plea agreements, the defendants 
objected to the PSR's loss calculation because it focused on the 
gain they realized from reselling the repossessed vehicles rather 
than the actual loss to the victims.  They maintained that the 
figure did not accurately represent the victims' loss because it 
did not account for the effect market forces and other external 
factors had on their resale price.  Although the defendants 
conceded that the court was entitled to set the loss at $120,000 
based on their stipulation, they contended that no higher loss 
figure was permissible because the fraudulent bids they had 
submitted, although falsified as to identity of the purchaser, 
represented the fair market value of the vehicles and, 
accordingly, there was no loss to the victims. 
 According to Petrucci's testimony, the defendants 
submitted bids in the name of fictitious purchasers because it 
was difficult to obtain bona fide bids from outside bidders, a 
contention supported by the testimony of another used car dealer 
who testified that most dealers were reluctant to become involved 
in the repossession bid market.  The defendants were concerned, 
according to Petrucci, that the failure to submit three bids in 
accordance with the standard practice of the banks would 
jeopardize their repossession business, which generated 
8 
approximately three times the income produced by their used car 
dealership.    
 Testimony as to the banks' method for evaluating bids 
on repossessed vehicles was presented by James Sweeney, a former 
collection manager for Atlantic Financial.  Sweeney explained 
that at the time an automobile was repossessed, the bank would 
determine a high and low bid for the vehicle.  The high bid would 
be eighty-five percent of the National Automobile Dealers 
Association ("NADA") book's average value for that car.  To 
obtain the low bid figure, the bank would reduce that figure 
based on the vehicle's condition and mileage, as represented in 
the vehicle condition reports and accompanying photographs. 
Sweeney testified that it was generally known in the repossession 
bid industry that banks valued their repossessed vehicles in this 
manner and thus that banks did not generally receive bids for 
more than eighty-five percent of "book" value.  Sweeney further 
explained that once the statutory no-bid period passed, it was 
important to obtain and accept a reasonable bid as quickly as 
possible in order to avoid mounting storage charges and further 
erosion of the bid price.0   
 The parties stipulated to testimony that Atlantic's bid 
evaluation methods were standard industry practice.  Sweeney also 
testified that, at Dickler's suggestion, defendants would 
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 According to Sweeney, an institution may not seek bids 
on repossessed vehicles under Pennsylvania law until 15 days 
after repossession.  He also indicated that bids were generally 
valid for only a short time because the NADA book was reissued 
every two weeks with continually depreciating values.   
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occasionally fix up the repossessed vehicle before selling it on 
the bank's behalf but, although this generated a higher return 
value for the bank, they elected not to sell most of the vehicles 
in this manner because they were more interested in simply 
disposing of the vehicles quickly.  According to Petrucci, 
Horizon had likewise declined defendants' suggestion to improve 
the condition of their vehicles before soliciting buyers. 
 The defendant also presented evidence to explain why 
their resale price was generally significantly higher than their 
purchase bid price.  Petrucci testified that all of the 
repossessed vehicles purchased from the banks and the RTC were 
detailed, and that many were also repaired before they were 
resold.  Various witnesses testified that cosmetic and repair 
work increases the price of a used vehicle disproportionately to 
the cost of the work.  Moreover, cars sold by used car dealers 
sell at higher prices than repossessed vehicles because 
repossessed vehicles are purchased on an "as is" basis and cannot 
be test-driven.0   
 The defendants also attempted to present evidence that 
the vehicle condition reports had not been falsified, but the 
court would not permit this testimony, stating that defendants 
could not now present evidence that contradicted the facts to 
which they had agreed during the change of plea hearings. 
                                                           
0
 When Action Motors resold the repossessed vehicles they 
were covered by Action Motors' insurance and could be test driven 
with Action Motors' dealer plates. 
10 
 The district court did not find the defendants' 
arguments and evidence persuasive.  The court rejected all of the 
defendants' substantive objections to the PSR's loss calculation 
and adopted the PSR's focus on the defendants' resale prices less 
the amount they paid for the vehicles and their costs for 
detailing work and repairs.  The court allowed only a deduction 
for computational errors of $34,765.50, resulting in a final loss 
calculation of $351,457.50.  Thus, under U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1, the 
court added nine levels to the base offense level of six because 
the loss involved in the offense was greater than $350,000 and 
less than $500,000.  That figure was increased another two levels 
for more than minimal planning, and increased an additional two 
levels for aggravating role, resulting in a total offense level 
of nineteen.  That figure was then reduced three levels for 
acceptance of responsibility, for a total adjusted offense level 
of sixteen.  This offense level, with a criminal history category 
of I, corresponded to a sentencing range for each defendant of 
twenty-one to twenty-seven months.  Within that range, the court 
sentenced Dickler to twenty-four months of imprisonment and 
Petrucci to twenty-one months.  These timely appeals followed.0 
                                                           
0
 The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231 as the defendants were charged with violations of 
federal law.  We exercise appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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II.   
 The threshold issue is whether the district court erred 
in refusing to admit evidence at the sentencing hearing tending 
to show that the condition reports submitted to the banks were 
not falsified.  The district court so ruled based on its view 
that when a defendant under oath expressly admits facts at a plea 
hearing in the course of persuading the court to accept his plea, 
he may not thereafter deny those facts any more than he may 
thereafter deny the facts alleged in the indictment and admitted 
by his plea. 
 The defendants do not challenge this legal conclusion 
as a general proposition.0  Rather, they insist that there were 
special circumstances here that should relieve them of the 
consequences that would ordinarily flow from an admission at a 
plea hearing.  First, according to the defendants, they did not 
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 We have held that facts relevant to sentencing 
contained in the indictment and plea agreement are conclusively 
established by the entry of a guilty plea even if they are not 
elements of the offense charged.  United States v. Parker, 874 
F.2d 174, 178 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that where indictment and 
plea agreement specified value of packages taken, entry of guilty 
plea conclusively established value for purposes of sentencing 
even though value was not an element of the offense charged); see 
also Crawford v. United States, 519 F.2d 347, 350 (4th Cir. 1975) 
("[T]he accuracy and truth of an accused's statements at a Rule 
11 proceeding in which his guilty plea is established are 
'conclusively' established by that proceeding unless and until he 
makes a reasonable allegation why this should not be so."), cert. 
denied, 423 U.S. 1057 (1976), and overruled on other grounds by 
United States v. Whitley, 759 F.2d 327 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
474 U.S. 873 (1985); Nesbitt v. United States, 773 F. Supp. 795, 
799 (E.D. Va. 1991) ("Sworn statements in a plea proceeding are 
conclusive unless the movant can demonstrate compelling reasons 
for questioning their truth, such as ineffective assistance of 
counsel."). 
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unambiguously admit that their scheme involved falsified 
condition reports.  Second, they claim surprise, pointing out 
that the indictment alleged only the submission of bids from 
fictitious bidders and insisting that they were "blindsided" by 
the government at the plea hearings.  We cannot accept either 
contention. 
 The transcript of the change of plea hearings simply 
does not support the defendants' first contention.  The 
government represented that it had evidence tending to show that 
false condition reports were a part of the defendants' scheme. 
Each defendant, in response to questioning from the court while 
under oath, then acknowledged that he agreed with what the 
government said he had done.  There was no ambiguity; there were 
clear admissions in each instance. 
 While we agree that the indictment did not put the 
defendants on notice of the government's false condition report 
contention, that fact provides no adequate explanation for the 
defendants' failure to take exception to that contention at the 
plea hearings.  Both defendants were sophisticated businessmen 
who were represented by counsel.  They and their counsel sat in 
court and listened to the government's representation regarding 
what it would prove if the case went to trial.  The government's 
description of its case was neither lengthy nor complex, and each 
defendant was asked point blank by the court whether he agreed or 
did not agree with the government's version of the facts. 
13 
 The defendants were thus in no position to contend at 
the sentencing hearing that falsified condition reports were not 




 The defendants pleaded guilty to a violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1032(2).0  Because their conduct involved a fraudulent 
bidding scheme, the court sentenced defendants under U.S.S.G.  
§ 2F1.1, the guideline provision applicable to crimes of fraud 
and deceit.  This guideline section provides for a base offense 
level of six with graduated enhancements of the offense level 
according to the size of "the loss" to the victim attributable to 
the fraudulent conduct.  The court determined their loss to be 
$351,457.50 which added nine levels. 
 While the general definition section of the Sentencing 
Guidelines does not define "the loss," the commentary to § 2F1.1 
discusses this concept.0  Application note 7 states in relevant 
part: 
 
 Valuation of loss is discussed in the 
Commentary to § 2B1.1 (Larceny, Embezzlement, 
                                                           
0
 This statute provides:  "Whoever . . . corruptly 
impeded or endeavors to impede the functions of [the Resolution 
Trust] Corporation . . . shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both."  18 U.S.C. § 1032(2). 
0
 All references to the Sentencing Guidelines, unless 
otherwise noted, are to the 1994 edition of the Guidelines Manual 
which was in effect at the time of the defendants' sentencing and 
incorporates amendments through November 1, 1993. 
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and Other Forms of Theft).0  As in theft 
cases, loss is the value of the money, 
property, or services unlawfully taken; it 
does not, for example, include interest the 
victim could have earned on such funds had 
the offense not occurred.  Consistent with 
the provisions of 2X1.1 (Attempt, 
Solicitation or Conspiracy), if an intended 
loss that the defendant was attempting to 
inflict can be determined, this figure will 
be used if it is greater than the actual 
loss.  Frequently, loss in a fraud case will 
be the same as in a theft case.  For example, 
if the fraud consisted of selling or 
attempting to sell $40,000 in worthless 
securities, or representing that a forged 
check for $40,000 was genuine, the loss would 
be $40,000. 
 
 There are, however, instances where 
additional factors are to be considered in 
determining the loss or intended loss, [for 
example]: 
 
 . . . . 
 
 In a case involving a misrepresentation 
concerning the quality of a consumer product, 
the loss is the difference between the amount 
paid by the victim for the product and the 
                                                           
0
 The commentary to section 2B1.1, which has a similar 
table for enhancement of the base offense level based on loss, 
defines "loss" as: 
 
the value of the property taken, damaged, or 
destroyed.  Ordinarily, when property is 
taken or destroyed the loss is the fair 
market value of the particular property at 
issue.  Where the market value is difficult 
to ascertain or inadequate to measure the 
harm to the victim, the court may measure 
loss in some other way, such as reasonable 
replacement cost to the victim. 
 
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. (n.2); see also id. § 2B1.1 cmt. 
(background) ("The value of property stolen plays an important 
role in determining sentences for theft and other offenses 
involving stolen property because it is an indicator of both the 
harm to the victim and the gain to the defendant."). 
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amount for which the victim could resell the 
product received. 
 
 . . . . 
 
 In fraudulent loan application cases and 
contract procurement cases, the loss is the 
actual loss to the victim (or if the loss has 
not yet come about, the expected loss). . . . 
However, where the intended loss is greater 
than the actual loss, the intended loss is to 
be used. 
 
 . . . . 
 
 In a case involving diversion of 
government program benefits, loss is the 
value of the benefits diverted from intended 
recipients or uses. 
U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1 cmt. (n.7). 
 We have previously interpreted § 2F1.1 and this 
commentary as requiring that the method for calculating the 
victim's loss correspond to the nature of the defendant's 
conduct.  Thus, where the defendant's fraud is similar to theft 
in that the defendant has "taken" something from the victim 
without giving the victim something of value in return, the value 
of the thing or service taken will reflect the victim's loss. 
However, where the defendant intended to and did give the victim 
something of value in exchange for what was fraudulently taken, 
the value of the object or service taken will not reflect the 
victim's actual loss and another method of calculating actual 
loss must be used.  United States v. Kopp, 951 F.2d 521, 528-31 
(3d Cir. 1991). 
 Our decision in United States v. Kopp provides a good 
illustration of this rule.  The defendant in Kopp had submitted 
16 
falsified loan documents to a bank and had thereby obtained a 
loan of $13.75 million.  Although the amount fraudulently taken 
was $13.75 million, the court rejected this figure as the loss 
under § 2F1.1 because the defendant had secured the loan with a 
mortgage on other property which enabled the bank to recover the 
loan proceeds when the defendant defaulted.  Thus, we explained: 
 
[The defendant] did not "take" $13.75 million 
for nothing, as a thief would.  Furthermore, 
all thefts involve an intent to deprive the 
victim of the value of the property taken. . 
. .[T]he same is not always true for fraud: 
some fraud involves an intent to walk away 
with the full amount fraudulently obtained, 
while other fraud is committed to obtain a 
contract the fraud perpetrator intends to 
perform. 
 
 Mechanical application of the theft 
guideline in fraud cases would frustrate the 
legislative purpose of the guidelines and 
contravene the specific language of the 
Commission. 
951 F.2d at 529 (citing United States v. Schneider, 930 F.2d 555, 
558 (7th Cir. 1991)). 
 In applying this flexible, fact-driven concept of loss, 
we have thus held that in situations where value passes in only 
one direction -- from the victim to the perpetrator -- the 
perpetrator's gain will normally reflect the victim's loss.  On 
the other hand, where value passes in both directions, we have 
held that the victim's loss will normally be the difference 
between the value he or she gave up and the value he or she 
received (or, if greater, the difference between what the 
perpetrator intended the victim to give up and to receive).   
17 
 Even where value flows in both directions, if it is not 
feasible to estimate with reasonable accuracy the victim's loss 
or intended loss, we have indicated that a sentencing court may 
look to the perpetrator's gain as a surrogate for the victim's 
loss.  United States v. Badaracco, 954 F.2d 928, 937-38 and n.10 
(3d Cir. 1992) (citing Kopp, 951 F.2d at 531).  Where property is 
received by the perpetrator of a fraud and promptly resold 
without alteration, for example, the proceeds from the resale 
will normally approximate the market value of the property when 
the victim parted with it; in such a situation, the defendant's 
gain can rationally serve as a surrogate for the victim's loss. 
The guideline provision governing fraud offenses refers to the 
victim's loss, however, and the defendant's gain may be used only 
when it is not feasible to estimate the victim's loss and where 
there is some logical relationship between the victim's loss and 
the defendant's gain so that the latter can reasonably serve as a 
surrogate for the former.  Without this logical connection, the 
defendant's gain cannot be said to be an "estimation" of actual 
loss, and as our precedent and the Sentencing Guidelines make 
clear, it is a reasonable estimation of loss, not an alternative, 
unrelated value, that the sentencing court must ascertain. 
U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1 cmt. (n.8) ("For the purposes of subsection 
(b)(1), the loss need not be estimated with precision.  The court 
need only make a reasonable estimate of the loss, given the 
available information. . . . The offender's gain from committing 
the fraud is an alternative estimate that ordinarily will 
underestimate the loss.") (emphasis added); cf. United States v. 
18 
Holloman, 981 F.2d 690 (3d Cir. 1992) (upholding use of 
defendant's gain as surrogate for victim's loss where value to 
defendant of stolen cancelled checks in counterfeiting scheme 
reflected bank's potential loss), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 3002 
(1993). 
 In Kopp, we specifically rejected the use of the 
defendant's gain as "an alternative estimate, when . . . the true 
loss is measurable."  951 F.2d at 530 (emphasis removed). 
Although we have subsequently refined the circumstances in which 
Kopp's specific actual loss calculation is applicable, we have 
not strayed from the concept that the loss calculation should 
represent the fraud victim's actual loss.  E.g., United States v. 
Shaffer, 35 F.3d 110, 114 (3d Cir. 1994) (distinguishing Kopp's 
focus on calculating victim's actual loss at the time of 
sentencing and holding that in check kiting scheme, loss should 
be calculated at time crime is detected because this more 
accurately reflects the bank's actual loss from the unsecured 
fraudulent "loans"); United States v. Mummert, 34 F.3d 201 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (upholding face value of loan as reasonable 
calculation of bank's actual loss where no assets had been 
pledged against the loan and no payments had been made thereon); 
see also United States v. Dadonna, 34 F.3d 163, 170-71 (3d Cir.) 
(holding that actual loss may not include developer's costs to 
complete construction project absent evidence linking those costs 
directly to defendant's conduct in fraudulently securing 
construction bonds), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 515 (1994). 
19 
 In this case, the district court found that the 
defendants' conduct had deprived it of the ability to make a 
reasonable estimate of the loss.  It reasoned that in each 
instance the bank expected to receive value equal to the best of 
three independently submitted bids and that because of the 
defendants' conduct, no one could ever know what that value would 
have been.  Accordingly, the district court looked to the 
defendants' gain from their scheme as a surrogate for the 
victims' loss.  It took the gross amount received by the 
defendants from their sale of the cars and deducted the expense 
of repairing and detailing, as well as the amount paid to the 
banks for the vehicles.  We find the district court's analysis 
troublesome in a number of respects. 
 
B. 
 We start with the proposition, based on the 
uncontradicted evidence, that there are two distinct markets 
involved here.  First, there is an "as is" market in which a 
buyer purchases a repossessed vehicle in the condition it was in 
at the time of repossession and without an opportunity to test 
drive it.  The second is a "reconditioned market" in which a 
buyer purchases a vehicle that has been repaired and detailed, 
and with an opportunity to test drive it.  A vehicle normally has 
a substantially lower value in the "as is" market than in the 
"reconditioned" market.  In addition to the fact that the risk of 
paying more than a vehicle is worth is materially greater in the 
"as is" market, resulting in lower purchase prices in that 
20 
market, the undisputed evidence indicated that when a vehicle is 
repaired and detailed, its value materially increases, often many 
times the amount invested in these activities.   
 The banks knew that both markets existed and they chose 
to participate, with immaterial exceptions, only in the "as is" 
market.  They did so primarily because they wanted to dispose of 
the vehicles and get paid quickly.  Moreover, when the banks 
asked the defendants to secure three bids on an "as is" basis, 
they did so in an effort to secure the fair market value of the 
vehicles in the "as is" market, not because they expected the 
defendants to find a particular type of bidder who would bid on 
average above the fair value in that market.  It follows, we 
believe, that the actual loss of the banks was the fair market 
value of the vehicles in the "as is" market, less what the 
defendants paid the banks for the vehicles. 
 The record contains substantial evidence relevant to a 
determination of the fair market value of the vehicles in the "as 
is" market.  According to the undisputed evidence, sellers in 
this market value vehicles by discounting the value of the 
vehicle reported in industry publications like the NADA "blue 
book" by fifteen percent and by further discounting the resulting 
value when there is above average mileage or below average 
condition.  Based on this evidence, the defendants urge that the 
district court's conclusion regarding the feasibility of 
estimating the loss cannot stand.  We agree. 
  It is true, as the district court found, that the 
defendants' conduct with respect to the submission of false 
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condition reports makes it difficult to now determine one factor 
in the evaluation formula -- the condition of each particular 
vehicle at the time of repossession.  Because the condition 
reports cannot be relied upon as evidence of the vehicles' actual 
condition, we acknowledge that the defendants' conduct has 
impaired the district court's ability to estimate the banks' 
losses in particular transactions.   
 As the defendants stress, however, the relevant value 
here is not the value of a particular vehicle, but rather the 
value of a stream of many vehicles over a seven year period. 
Moreover, the uncontradicted evidence indicates that, because of 
the financial circumstances of their owners, repossessed 
vehicles, on average, have been less well maintained and are in 
poorer condition than vehicles of the same age generally. 
Finally, we know that, as a result, those selling in the "as is" 
market regard 85% of the "blue book" value as the high side of 
the value range and generally consider condition only for the 
purpose of determining whether the fair value is less than 85% of 
book value.  One can argue persuasively on the basis of this 
record evidence that the fair market value of the stream in the 
"as is" market would be no more than 85% of the aggregate "blue 
book" value of all of the vehicles and that a comparison of this 
figure with the aggregate amount the banks received from the 
defendants for the vehicles would provide an estimate of the 
banks' loss that should serve as a ceiling for purposes of loss 
calculation under § 2F1.1. 
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 We do not say that the evidence cited by the defendants 
compels a conclusion that it is feasible to arrive at a 
satisfactory estimate of the banks' losses here.  We hold, 
however, that it was sufficiently probative on that issue that 
the district court was not at liberty to accept the government's 
evidence of the defendants' gain as a surrogate without some 
explanation of why an estimate of loss based on this data was not 
feasible.  Accordingly, we will remand to provide the district 
court with an opportunity to reevaluate the feasibility of making 
a satisfactory determination of the victim's aggregate losses. 
 
C. 
 The second arrow to the defendants' bow is based on 
data gathered from Horizon's records for the period from November 
of 1989 to November of 1990.  According to the defendants, these 
were the only records of the victims available to them.  During 
this period Horizon sold a total of 1,103 repossessed vehicles. 
Action Motors bought 103 or 9% of these vehicles.  The rest were 
sold to others.  The largest single purchaser was a dealer in 
eastern Pennsylvania, Yelland.  Horizon received an average 
return on all 1,103 vehicles equal to 96.51% of a value 
designated on defendants' exhibits as the "appraised value."  On 
vehicles sold to Yelland the average return was 95.26% of 
"appraised value."  By comparison, Horizon received a 97.01% 
return on the vehicles sold to Action Motors.   
 The district court was unpersuaded by this data for the 
following reasons: 
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Defendant was the agent of the institutions 
and had an obligation to solicit bids to 
obtain the highest possible price for the 
cars.  Defendant did not fulfill this 
obligation and solicited no independent bids. 
(Defendant's position at ¶9).  Rather, 
defendant's company purchased the cars, 
hiding its true identity.  Thus, the fair 
market value of the cars is unascertainable 
because of defendant's own conduct.  The fact 
that the institutions may have received a 
higher percentage of the cars' appraisal 
value from defendant than they received, on 
average, from other purchasers is of little 
relevance. The cars that defendant purchased 
may have been in better condition than other 
cars that the financial institutions sold. 
App. at 161-62. 
 To the extent this conclusion rests on the district 
court's view that the market value of the cars in the "as is" 
market "is of little relevance" because the banks bargained for 
three bids solicited by Atlantic, we have already noted our 
disagreement.  To the extent it rests on the district court's 
speculation that the 103 repossessed vehicles purchased by Action 
Motors may have been in better condition on average than the 
1,103 repossessed vehicles purchased by others, we find that 
speculation inadequate to support the district court's rejection 
of this approach to loss estimation.  Given the volume of 
vehicles and the duration of the period involved, we do not 
believe the district court was entitled to conclude without some 
supporting record explanation that the 103 vehicles assigned to 
Action for repossession were in materially better condition than 
those assigned to others for repossession. 
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 We confess that our study has left us without 
confidence that we understand exactly what the "appraised value" 
refers to and how it was derived.  At the same time, the record 
appears to indicate that the "appraised value" on Horizon's books 
came from a source not dependent on Action's condition reports, 
was regularly recorded on Horizon's books, and was presumably 
relied upon by it for some business purpose.0  While it is not a 
necessary inference, we believe a trier of fact could infer from 
this information that the "appraised value" of the various 
vehicles was determined in some reasonably consistent manner.  If 
one draws this inference, this data concerning a substantial 
sample of the relevant universe of transactions appears to 
indicate that Horizon received more from the vehicles it sold to 
Action Motors than it received from its other sales in the "as 
is" market.  Unless one is willing to assume that the sales to 
others were also tainted with fraud, this would suggest that the 
sales to defendants, on average, were not at prices below market 
value in the "as is" market.    
 It is not for us to decide in the first instance 
whether any or all of these inferences should be drawn.  On 
remand, the district court should take a fresh look at the data 
                                                           
0
 Horizon used an independent damage appraiser, J. M. 
Taylor, to assess the condition of its repossessed vehicles, but 
there was conflicting evidence regarding the use that Horizon 
made of these damage reports.  The defendants point to evidence 
indicating that Horizon used the damage reports, along with the 
defendants' vehicle condition reports, to determine an 
appropriate target bid, while a government witness testified that 
Horizon used them only to determine the residual value of the 
vehicle to the lessee. 
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from Horizon's books and determine whether or not, based on that 




 The third arrow to the defendants' bow is an 
alternative argument that grants, arguendo, the validity of the 
proposition that a reasonable estimate of victim loss is not 
feasible.  If the district court was entitled to look to the 
defendants' gain as a surrogate for the victim's loss, the 
defendants insist that it erred in deducting only the defendants' 
repair and detailing expenses and the purchase price paid the 
banks.  Specifically, the defendants argue that the district 
court, if it looked to gain, was required to deduct the 
commissions paid to salespersons at Action Motors for reselling 
the cars (allegedly $40,820.79) and auction and transportation 
expenses related to the resales (allegedly $7,180.00).  In 
addition, the defendants argue for a further $16,017.96 reduction 
in their gain, a figure that reflects the difference between the 
vehicles they resold at auction and the vehicles they resold to 
individuals in the retail market.  Since the district court set 
the gain at $351,457.50, one or more of these adjustments could 
make a difference in the guideline range. 
 The district court found the argument regarding the 
defendants' additional expenses "without merit" because the 
"focus of the Court should be on the loss to the victim, not the 
costs of committing the crime to the defendant."  App. at 165. 
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"Even if the defendant[s] incurred these costs," the court 
reasoned, "they are not clearly connected to the actual losses 
sustained in this case, which is the lost value on the cars that 
the financial institutions sold to the defendant[s]."  Id. 
 Having determined to look to the defendants' gain as a 
surrogate for the victim's loss, we believe the district court 
was not entitled to give credit for certain expenses that reduced 
the defendants' gain and ignore others that would have the same 
effect on the ground that the latter were not clearly connected 
to the bank's loss.0  In short, we find it impossible to 
logically distinguish between the defendants' repair costs and 
the commissions and auction costs they paid in order to realize 
their gain.0   
                                                           
0
 While the district court was, of course, entitled to 
pass upon the probative value of the evidence regarding the other 
expenses, it made no finding that this evidence was not worthy of 
belief.  To the contrary, based on the district court's findings 
and conclusions and the fact that this evidence of other expenses 
was uncontradicted and unchallenged by the government, it appears 
that the district court regarded it as credible, but not legally 
relevant. 
0
 In United States v. Badaracco, 954 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 
1992) we approved the use of the defendant's gain as a surrogate 
for the victim's loss and declined to deduct the defendant's 
expenses from the amount of his gain.  Our refusal there to give 
the defendant credit for his expenses is not contrary to the 
position we take here.  Badaracco involved a bank officer whose 
fraud involved conditioning construction loans on developers' 
subcontracting out the electrical work to companies in which the 
defendant had an interest.  We found this type of fraud to be 
like embezzlement and concluded that an analogy to the theft 
guidelines was therefore proper.  On this basis, we upheld the 
district court's use of the defendant's gain, measured in terms 
of the full amount of the contracts awarded to the defendant's 
electrical companies, as a reasonable estimate of the loss under 
§ 2F1.1.  We refused to deduct the expenses of the defendant's 
companies because a three-party transaction was involved and 
those expenses neither conferred a benefit on the bank nor were 
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 The other adjustment requested by the defendants is 
also appropriate.  The argument is that if the sentencing court 
follows a gain approach because it cannot estimate the victim's 
loss with reasonable precision, and the defendant demonstrates 
that a component of the total gain is attributable solely to its 
own efforts after the victim's loss was complete, that component 
must be deducted.  More specifically, the record shows the price 
received by Action Motors on the resale of each vehicle, 
including the price on those sold at auction and those sold at 
retail.  The value received on retail resales over and above what 
would have been received at auction is attributable, according to 
the defendants, solely to their own efforts and must be deducted 
before their gain can serve as a reasonable surrogate for the 
victim's loss.  The district court rejected this argument because 
"the fact that the defendants' profit percentage . . . on his 
retail car sales was greater than his wholesale profit margin 
does not inform [the] Court about the actual losses on the cars." 
App. at 166. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
logically related to anything received by the bank in the 
transaction.  As we have pointed out, the banks' loss in this 
case was the difference between what they gave up (the value of 
the cars at the time they were sold to defendants) and what they 
received (the amount paid by the defendants for the cars).  Gain 
can logically serve as a surrogate for loss here only to the 
extent it reflects the value of what the banks gave up.  Based on 
the uncontradicted evidence in this case, it appears that the 
expenses incurred by the defendants between the time they 
purchased the cars and resold them contributed to their resale 
value.  Accordingly, the resale value cannot be used as a 
surrogate for the value of the vehicles at the time of their 
purchase by the defendants without deducting their expenses. 
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 Again, we believe the district court misunderstood the 
import of the argument being made.  We do not suggest that the 
district court needs to view this argument with an uncritical 
eye.  We do say, however, that the underlying legal premise is a 
sound one.  When a gain approach is used as a surrogate for loss 
fraud and the defendant demonstrates that a component of the gain 
as calculated by the government could not be a component of the 
victim's loss, an appropriate adjustment is required. 
 
E. 
 The fourth and final arrow to the defendants' bow in 
their attack on the district court's calculation of loss is 
premised on the fact that it included the defendants' gain on all 
purchases that occurred between 1985 and December of 1992. 
According to the defendants, the victim's loss under § 2F1.1 can 
include only loss attributable to "relevant conduct" under  
§ 1B1.3(a)(2) and "relevant conduct" can include only conduct 
proscribed by a criminal statute.  Because the bids they 
submitted to the RTC prior to November 29, 1990, the effective 
date of 18 U.S.C. § 1032(2), were not in violation of that 
statute, the defendants maintain that it was reversible error to 
include any loss attributable to those bids. 
 The conduct underlying the indictment involved two 
periods: the period during which defendants submitted false bids 
to Horizon (1985 to June 1989) and Atlantic (1985 to January 
1990), and the period during which they submitted false bids to 
the RTC who had been appointed custodians of the failed banks 
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(June 1989 or January 1990 to December 1992).  Counts One and Two 
of the indictment, which were dismissed at sentencing, were based 
on the conduct during the earlier period and Count Three, to 
which the defendants pleaded guilty, was based on the conduct 
during the latter period.  There is no question that the 
defendants' actions in defrauding the banks during the early 
period is "relevant conduct" within the meaning of the Sentencing 
Guidelines and thus that any loss attributable to that conduct 
may be used to calculate the defendants' offense level under 
U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1.0  The defendants argue, however, that because 
the statute underlying their guilty pleas, 18 U.S.C. 1032(2), was 
not enacted until November 29, 1990, their acts vis-a-vis the RTC 
prior to that date cannot be considered relevant conduct for 
purposes of determining loss.  The district court regarded all 
sales as relevant conduct without finding that the bids during 
the challenged period were criminal conduct.  If the defendants 
are right, this would require a $101,562.23 reduction in the 
district court's loss calculation. 
                                                           
0
  "Relevant conduct" includes acts that were part of the 
same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense 
conduct if those acts would be grouped as multiple counts under 
U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(d) had the defendant been convicted of those 
counts.  See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2) & cmt.(n.3).  The bank fraud 
and RTC fraud counts would be grouped as related counts under  
§ 3D1.2(d) because the offense level for both offenses is 
determined on the basis of total loss.  Moreover, as part of the 
plea agreement, the defendants acknowledged their responsibility 
for the conduct charged in Counts One and Two and stipulated that 
that conduct could be considered "relevant conduct" for purposes 
of sentencing.  See also U.S.S.G. § 6B1.2(a) (conduct underlying 
charges dismissed pursuant to a plea agreement can not be 
excluded from consideration in sentencing by the terms of the 
plea agreement). 
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 Although this court has not yet addressed the question, 
other courts of appeals have concluded that "relevant conduct" 
within the meaning of § 1B1.3 must be criminal conduct.  See 
United States v. Sheahan, 31 F.3d 595, 600 (8th Cir. 1994) ("We 
agree that the relevant conduct the sentencing court should 
consider in the section 2F1.1 loss calculation is that which is 
attributable to the defendant's 'criminal conduct.'"); United 
States v. Wilson, 980 F.2d 259, 261 (4th Cir. 1992) (same).0 The 
government does not contend otherwise, and we agree.0 
 The relevant criminal conduct need not be conduct with 
which the defendant was charged, United States v. Santiago, 906 
F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1990), nor conduct over which the federal court 
has jurisdiction, United States v. Pollard, 986 F.2d 44 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2457 (1993).  Thus, the district 
court's use of the loss attributable to the challenged period 
could be upheld if the defendants' conduct during that period was 
shown to constitute any state or federal crime, since it is clear 
                                                           
0
 Without directly addressing this issue, other courts 
have presumed that relevant conduct is criminal.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Palomba, 31 F.3d 1456, 1464 n.8 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(For purposes of provision permitting grouping of closely related 
counts, relevant conduct is defined inter alia with reference to 
similarity between charges of conviction and "other criminal 
conduct."); United States v. Shonubi, 998 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1993) 
(The guideline provision defining relevant conduct with respect 
to a "course of conduct" refers to identifiable pattern of 
criminal conduct.); United States v. Bethley, 973 F.2d 396, 401 
(5th Cir. 1992) (Relevant conduct involves "repeated instances of 
criminal behavior [that] constitute a pattern of criminal 
conduct."), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1323 (1993). 
0
 While § 1B1.3 does not expressly so state, it defines 
relevant conduct in terms that are more consistent with the 
hypothesis that relevant conduct is limited to criminal behavior.  
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that the conduct was part of the same on-going scheme as the 
offense conduct.  See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2).  For some 
inexplicable reason, however, the government did not present 
evidence at the sentencing hearing or argue in its brief on 
appeal that the conduct during that period was otherwise 
criminal.  Nevertheless, at oral argument before this court the 
government suggested a number of criminal offenses which the 
defendants were said to have committed by submitting fictitious 
bids to the RTC0 and asked that we affirm the district court's 
inclusion of the loss that occurred during the challenged period 
on this basis. 
 While we think it highly likely that the defendants' 
conduct during the challenged period did violate some criminal 
statute, we decline to accept the government's invitation.  Due 
process requires that the defendants have fair notice of exactly 
why the government believes their conduct during this period was 
criminal and a fair opportunity to counter the government's case 
on that score.  In order to be fair, such an opportunity may have 
to include an opportunity to offer additional evidence. 
Accordingly, on remand, the district court should require the 
                                                           
0
  The government cited the federal mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1341, and the Pennsylvania criminal fraud statutes, e.g., 18 
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 4107 (deceptive business practices); id. § 
4101 (criminal forgery).  As we understand a conservatorship 
under the RTC's statute, the bank does not cease to exist when 
the RTC is appointed conservator.  Accordingly, it may be that 
the submission of fictitious bids to the RTC violated 
Pennsylvania's bank fraud statute (e.g., 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
§ 4133) or even the then current version of 18 U.S.C. § 1344, the 
statute underlying Counts One and Two and making it a crime to 
defraud a bank insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation. 
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government to identify the statute or statutes it relies upon and 
to identify the record evidence that satisfies each element of 
the offense proscribed.  The defendants should then be afforded 




 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the 
defendants' sentences and remand for resentencing.  On remand, 
the question may arise whether the district court is restricted 
to resentencing the defendants based on the current record, plus 
whatever the defendants may have to offer in response to the 
government's designation of a criminal offense applicable to the 
defendants' pre-November 29, 1990, conduct vis-a-vis the RTC. 
Stated conversely, the issue may arise whether the district court 
may reopen the record to permit further development of the 
relevant facts in light of this opinion.  We do not preclude the 
district court from permitting further development of the record 
and leave that for resolution by an exercise of the district 
court's informed discretion. 
 We agree with the Fourth and the D.C. Circuit Courts of 
Appeal that, where the government has the burden of production 
                                                           
0
  United States v. Pollard, 986 F.2d 44 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. 
denied, 113 S. Ct. 2457 (1993), does not provide support for the 
proposition that we must search the record ourselves and 
determine whether the defendants' conduct was otherwise criminal. 
In Pollard, the defendant did not argue that the relevant conduct 
was non-criminal, but only that the federal court was without 
jurisdiction to charge him based on that conduct. 
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and persuasion as it does on issues like enhancement of the 
offense level under § 2F1.1 based on the victim's loss, its case 
should ordinarily have to stand or fall on the record it makes 
the first time around.  It should not normally be afforded "a 
second bite at the apple."  United States v. Leonzo, 50 F.3d 
1086, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (remanding for resentencing on the 
existing record where government failed to sustain its burden of 
proving loss under § 2F1.1); United States v. Parker, 30 F.3d 
542, 553-54 (4th Cir.) (no new evidence permitted on resentencing 
where prosecution had failed to introduce sufficient evidence 
that offense took place within 1000 feet of a "playground" within 
meaning of statute), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 605 (1994).  At the 
same time, we perceive no constitutional or statutory impediment 
to the district court's providing the government with an 
additional opportunity to present evidence on remand if it has 
tendered a persuasive reason why fairness so requires.  See 
United States v. Ortiz, 25 F.3d 934, 935 (10th Cir. 1994) 
(holding that an order vacating sentence and remanding for 
resentencing contemplates a de novo hearing at which court can 
receive any evidence it could have considered during first 
sentencing hearing); United States v. Cornelius, 968 F.2d 703, 
705 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that district court erred in 
refusing to consider defendants' evidence upon resentencing); 
United States v. Jacobs, 955 F.2d 7, 10 (2d Cir. 1992) (per 
curiam) (where original sentence had been vacated because there 
was insufficient evidence connecting conspiracy's income to drug 
sales, district court could on remand consider "reliable new 
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evidence" on this issue; United States v. Stern, 13 F.3d 489, 498 
(1st Cir. 1994) ("where a sentence is vacated and remanded for 
redetermination under correct principles, the government is not 
automatically foreclosed from offering evidence pertinent to the 
newly established rule.") 
 Where, as here, the government believes that it is not 
feasible to estimate the victim's loss and its evidence, in the 
absence of the defendant's evidence, would support a finding to 
that effect, it will frequently not be fair to expect the 
government to be prepared with evidence concerning any theory of 
loss calculation the defendant may advance at the sentencing 
hearing.  If the government, for want of notice or any other 
reason beyond its control, does not have a fair opportunity to 
fully counter the defendant's evidence and the government's 
theory does not carry the day, the district court is entitled to 
permit further record development on remand. 
 By making these observations, we do not suggest that 
the government should or should not be permitted to offer further 
evidence in this case on remand.  The district court is in a far 
better position than we to assess the situation in the light of 
the circumstances surrounding the original sentencing hearing. 
 
V. 
 We hold that the district court did not err when it 
refused to entertain evidence tending to show that the condition 
reports were not falsified.  We further hold, however, that the 
district court's findings and conclusions do not support the 
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sentences imposed.  Accordingly, we will reverse the judgments of 
the district court and remand for resentencing. 
 On remand, the district court will revisit its 
conclusion that it is not feasible to estimate the banks' and 
RTC's loss with a reasonable degree of accuracy.  At a minimum, 
this will involve a reevaluation of the defendants' evidence 
concerning the trade practice regarding the valuation of vehicles 
to be sold in the "as is" market and Horizon's sales proceeds 
between November 1989 and November 1990.  If the district court 
concludes that it is feasible to estimate the victims' losses, it 
will resentence the defendants based on the stipulated loss of 
$120,000 unless the government demonstrates that a greater loss 
was incurred. 
  If the district court once again determines it 
appropriate to look to the defendants' gain as a surrogate for 
the banks' loss, it will deduct from the gross gain all expenses 
necessarily incurred in realizing that gain and any component of 
the gain necessarily attributable solely to the defendants' 
investment of their own resources after their purchase of the 
vehicles from the banks.  Finally, the district court shall not 
include any gain attributable to bids received by the RTC prior 
to November 29, 1990, unless it determines that those bids were 
made in violation of a specific state or federal criminal 
statute. 
